The Iraq war & the ensuing occupation was a clusterfuck of epic proportions. This post isn’t about that. This post is about the operation carried out by US military to defeat Iraqi forces. Having just finished COBRA II, there are many lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom that apply to running projects & team, as well as shipping impactful software
Be wary of a detailed plan & trust your team
In planning the invasion, US Centcom Chief Tommy Franks put together a detailed plan which described specifically how quickly American forces would move to capture Baghdad, and the dates at which they would cross specific bridges. He shared this plan with his land forces commanders, & asked them to operationalize it. The central assumptions of the plan were that American forces would face stiff opposition from Iraqi mechanized forces, & that southern cities in Iraq would join the American forces.
Reality turned out to be different. In southern cities, American forces were stumped by paramilitary forces (Fidayeen) as well as civilians who used small arms fire (RPGs, AK 47s) to ambush and slow down their advance. Instead of a conventional enemy line, American forces were in a 360 degree fight.
The land forces commanders saw this, and decided to slow down the advance because they didn’t want to leave their supply lines & rear exposed. This was not in keeping with the detailed plan which US Centcom & the Pentagon were anchored on. The Pentagon & Centcom leadership saw this as a sign of weakness, risk averseness, as well as bad decision making by the land forces commanders.
There is an important lesson here for us. It is important to be goal oriented, & keep planning based on latest insight. This is especially true in irregular environments (new products, risky initiatives, etc). In these situations, be wary of a detailed plan & encourage your team that is immersed in the work to keep their eyes open & keep “re-planning” based on latest insight.
Theory =/= Real world
The Pentagon had deployed a lot of technology in the battlefield to give all land forces “real time battlefield awareness”. In theory, this would ensure all forces had real time awareness of each other through a “blue force tracker”, be able to co-ordinate better & as a result, move rapidly. Further, the blue forces tracker would give real time insight to US Centcom as well as the Pentagon on the advance of the US land forces.
Reality turned out to be different. The blue forces tracker provided insight to troops about each other, & would have worked great if there was a well defined enemy line. Because US forces were under a 360 attack whenever they engaged the enemy, all the blue force tracker told field commanders was that troops weren’t moving as planned, and this confused most of them. One land commander quipped that what the troops needed was a red forces tracker.
To make matters worse, US Centcom had access to the blue force tracker, and they noted that the land forces weren’t moving as fast as planned. They in turn pressured the field commanders who were facing an enemy they hadn’t trained for. Instead of providing real time intelligence, the technology provided real time confusion.
What worked elsewhere might not work here
In Afghanistan, US special forces played an instrumental role in winning the war. They were able to partner with rebel forces in Northern Afghanistan, & direct air attacks to quickly defeat the Taliban. This had convinced Pentagon leadership that special forces could be used similarly in Iraq as well.
The Pentagon felt that the Shias in southern Iraq would rebel against Saddam when they saw an American invasion, and special forces would be able to direct them & air attacks to defeat the enemy.
Unfortunately, none of this happened. Shias in southern Iraq didn’t rebel. On the contrary, US forces faced strong opposition from paramilitary forces, in cities like Samawah & Nasiriyah. In addition to slowing down land forces, this neutralized any kind of advantage US special forces could provide.
If there is no place for it, don’t shoe-horn it in
Following up on the previous point, the Pentagon was determined to deploy US special forces. The Pentagon felt that Iraqi forces would blow up the Haditha dam in Western Iraq to cause a flood & slow down US forces. They rushed US special forces to take control of the dam, which the forces did successfully.
Once the forces got there, they realized that Iraqis had no plans to blow up the dam & that the dam was in disrepair. Iraqis who could maintain & operate the dam were either killed or had fled, & the special forces had no idea how to operate a dam that was in disrepair. Luckily, the dam continued to operate till US could bring some experts in (a few weeks)
Ironically, shoe horning forces almost led to a disaster that Pentagon leadership wanted to avoid.
Overall, there’s many useful lessons to draw from the invasion, but at the highest level, what’s important is constant planning & re-evaluation with a clear goal in mind, not sticking to a detailed plan designed before execution. For leadership & management, emphasizing inflow of communication from the front lines is critical to success.
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